Deciphering an American presidential administration is truly yeoman's work. Whether the Obama Administration is significantly distinct from previous administrations is too early to judge. Arguably, the task should be left to historians. Nevertheless, even a casual perusal of President Obama's Middle East policy (perhaps best described as 'policy') reflects a combination of naiveté, inconsistency and murkiness.
1 While perhaps by design, the impact-on the ground-is deeply troublesome. While domestic political considerations are a reality, the implications of the Administration's policy in an area of the world as treacherous as the Middle East are, potentially, staggering.
2 President Obama's policy (assuming a coherent policy exists) has been particularly problematic on two distinct fronts: inconsistency in determining under what conditions intervention is justified and a sharp dissonance between suggested expectations and actual delivery. 3 The latter is 1 Compare Douglas J. Feith & Seth Cropsey, The Obama Doctrine Defined, COMMENT., July-Aug. 2011, at 11, available at http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/theobama-doctrine-defined/ ("The United States under Barack Obama is less assertive, less dominant, less power-minded, less focused on the American people's particular interests, and less concerned about preserving U.S. freedom of action."), with Fareed Zakaria, Should U.S. Foreign Policy Be One-Size-Fits-All?, CNN (July 10, 2011), http://globalpublicsquare.blogs. cnn.com/2011/07/10/should-u-s-foreign-policy-be-one-size-fits-all/ (discussing consistency in U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East). 2 See Barbara Slavin, Keeping up with Mideast Changes, NEW ATLANTICIST: POL'Y AND ANALYSIS BLOG (July 6, 2011), http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/keeping-mideastchanges?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+new_ atlanticist+%28New+Atlanticist%29 (providing an alternative analysis on the political considerations of the Middle East). 3 See Glenn Greenwald, U.S. More Unpopular in the Arab World than Under Bush, SALON (July 13, 2011, 8:14 AM), http://www.salon.com/news/middle_east/index.html? story=/opinion/greenwald/2011/07/13/arabs (stating "anti-American sentiment is now at dangerously-even unprecedentedly-high levels."). most clearly demonstrated both in the President's Cairo speech 4 and his May 19, 2011 talk in which he called on Israel to return to the 1967 (pre Six Day War) borders. 5 In the former, President Obama overtly suggested a distinct change forthcoming in U.S. policy regarding the Israel-Palestinian conflict; the failure to 'deliver' has led to extraordinary disappointment amongst Palestinians who assumed change was in the offing. 6 Arguably, the Palestinian demand for declaration of Palestinian statehood by the U.N. General Assembly is a direct result of disappointment with the President's failure to 'deliver' the suggested change.
With respect to the second example, the President's speech reflected the oft-used expression in college basketball referring to a student-athlete who leaves college after his freshman year for the NBA: "one and done." 7 Simply put: the President's speech was absolutely lacking in any follow-up 8 as neither details nor the identity of a new Peace Negotiator 9 were revealed. That lack of detail, particularly in the aftermath of the Cairo and Washington, D.C. speeches, which hinted at significant policy movement and direction, has directly contributed to inconsistent policy articulation and development. That inconsistency is particularly evident when comparing the decision to intervene militarily in Libya 10 with the decision to not intervene in Syria. While perhaps the inconsistency is predicated on careful geopolitical analysis, the Administration's actions raise questions regarding the essence of intervention, regardless of whether it is predicated on military or . 6 See, e.g., Dan Ephron, The Wrath of Mahmoud Abbas, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 24, 2011, 10:26 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/04/25/mahmoud-abbas-interviewpalestinian-leaders-frustration-with-obama.html (stating that President Obama, "who seemed open to helping the Palestinian cause before his election, quickly cooled once he got into office-and at a crucial moment, betrayed [Mahmoud Abbas]."). 7 Middle East Speech, supra note 5 (discussing negotiations for "a viable Palestine, a secure Israel."). 8 The speech he gave at AIPAC . 20 The principle of intervention raises profound questions regarding both the limits of national sovereignty and articulation of national self-interest. 21 Needless to say, what is defined as intervention can also be described as imperialism (as evidenced in many of the aforementioned cases of Western intervention in the Middle East); after all, Western powers have historically perceived Middle East oil and trade routes as essential to their national interests and have, therefore, imposed themselves on indigenous populations. 22 The historical basis for Western imperialism was, largely, a combination of: availability of much needed natural resources; cheap labor; geopolitics; and Christian missionaries. 23 The result was both taking (natural resources) and purported giving (Christianity and democratic values). 24 The intended beneficiary was the Western power; in large part, the indigenous people were enormously victimized. That said, some have suggested Western powers also contributed to local cultures by introducing democratic values and traditions, but the grim tale of post-colonial Africa suggests a significantly different reality.
One From an American perspective, the desire to achieve a particular regional gain often resulted in the U.S. supporting unsavory regimes and leaders 25 for the sole purpose of denying the Soviet Union a perceived gain. 26 In the Cold War context, "victory" was piecemeal (if at all), largely limited by the doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD), and mainly devoid of principle other than perceived gain (however defined) at the expense of the other side.
The obsession with the other side led both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to costly military interventions; Brezhnev's decision to invade Afghanistan (1979) 27 was arguably the beginning of the end of the U.S.S.R., and the Kennedy-Johnson 28 decision to deploy the U.S. military to Vietnam (early 1960's) continues to have a dramatic impact on the U.S. budget, psyche and armed forces. In both cases, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. intervened in a conflict that was 'not theirs.' Soldiers were sent to countries whose language, culture and conflict were foreign to the ordinary soldier, whose mission (other than to stay alive) was unarticulated beyond vague and confused rhetoric.
Unfortunately, the vagueness of overseas missions continues to haunt U.S. policy makers to this day: a talk before cadets at the U.S. That said, military intervention can also occur for humanitarian purposes; NATO intervention (albeit after much tragedy and atrocity) in the former Yugoslavia is a clear example, 33 as is U.S. intervention in Haiti. 34 The philosophy behind humanitarian intervention is simple: it stems from the principle that "intervention for human protection purposes . . . is supportable when major harm to civilians is occurring or imminently apprehended, and the state in question is unable or unwilling to end the harm, or is itself the perpetrator." 35 In other words, humanitarian intervention is based on the belief that "when a government turns savagely upon its own people . . ." it becomes the responsibility of "[a]ny state capable of stopping the slaughter . . . to try to do so."
36
Despite the relatively recent use of the term "humanitarian intervention," modern history is replete with examples of such intervention. Some of the earliest occurrences of humanitarian intervention extend back to the nineteenth century, with the notable interventions by the United Kingdom, France, and Russia in Syria, Naples, and Greece to prevent local governments from murdering citizens of the respective countries. 37 Since 
III. THE MIDDLE EAST TODAY
In the not too distant past, the term "Middle East" referred to a limited number of countries, including Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Syria. Today, the term incorporates an extraordinary broad swath of land stretching from the edge of North Africa to the 'traditional' Middle East, to the Persian Gulf, to Turkey, to the Caucus Mountains, to Afghanistan and possibly Pakistan.
42 From a geographical perspective this 'crescent' (the reference is to physical parameters only) is the new Middle East that includes 4.34% of the earth's physical territory 43 and 3.35% of the world's population. 44 Included in this crescent are a significant number of contemporary national and international conflicts such as those in Afghanistan, Iraq, the civil war in Libya, 45 This short list does not include-arguably-the most dramatic event of the past year: the so-called "Arab Spring," 51 particularly the dramatic resignation of President Hosni Mubarak and the resulting uncertainty regarding the future face of Egypt. While elections previously scheduled for September 2011 have been postponed to the late fall, 52 it is an open question whether they will be held and how the domestic political map of the Arab world's largest country will be re-aligned. One of the most important, albeit unanswered, questions is the future role of the Muslim Brotherhood 53 and its impact both domestically and with respect to the Egyptian-Israel Peace Treaty. 54 While some commentators were extraordinarily optimistic in the wake of Mubarak's downfall, 55 others suggested a "wait and see" attitude, In addition, a number of regional (broadly defined) hotspots deserve careful vigilance by U.S. policymakers; in particular, Pakistan, whose duplicitous "double game" is of particular concern.
58 While ostensibly an American ally, the Pakistani government 59 provided Osama Bin Laden with "cover"; the fact that the U.S. apparently did not notify Pakistan of the impending violation of Pakistani sovereignty is indicative of the Obama Administration's-justified-deep mistrust of Islamabad. This is particularly troublesome for all the obvious reasons: many terrorist attacks that occur in India are Pakistani linked, funded, and supported; 60 northwest Pakistan is a Taliban stronghold and significant concerns rightly exist regarding the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal should the regime fall.
Similarly, concerns have been raised regarding Turkey; a mere glance at a map of the world reinforces the extraordinary geo-political significance of the country that straddles Europe and Asia. The domestic push and pull regarding 'Turkey to where' was exacerbated by the European Union's short-sighted decision to deny Turkey membership; 61 64 In addition, concern was raised in many circles regarding the possible strengthening of ties between Turkey and Iran. 65 However, the influx of Syrian refugees 66 into Turkey and the alleged presence of Iranian forces 67 in Syria assisting the Syrian government massacre civilians has apparently forced Turkey to re-evaluate its relationship both with Syria and Iran. While not suggesting Turkey will reengage with the West, it does hint at a re-assessment of where Turkish interests best lie. Saudi Arabia's vulnerability produces constant anxiety in the U.S., given U.S. dependence on Saudi oil. 68 The continued dependence on oil consumption and by extension on Saudi Arabia and the Emirates is one of the great failings of 20 th century technology. That dependence and the inability to develop alternative energy sources place the U.S. in a particularly precarious position. While the Saudi military is largely dependent on the ports nearly 85% of the oil produced in Libya. 90 Based on totals from earlier this year, Libyan oil accounts for the following percentages of European oil imports: Italy 22%, Austria 21%, France 16%, Greece 15%, Spain 12%, Portugal 11%, United Kingdom 9%, and Germany 8%. 91 However, the same cannot be said with respect to the U.S. which imports only 0.2% of its oil from Libya. 92 In other words, America's relationship with Libya for the past 25 years is best defined as 'wary but distant' with almost no direct mutual interests at stake. Israeli Prime Minister Barak also sought to diplomatically engage Assad under the auspices of the Clinton Administration, though ultimately to no avail. 99 In spite of these failures, the U.S. and Syria enjoyed full diplomatic relations, though efforts to engage President Assad in peace talks have thoroughly failed. 100 The brutally repressive regime of President Assad (the father) was made clear in the 1982 massacre in the Syrian town of Hamma; over 10,000 citizens were massacred when Assad ordered the Syrian army to squash a purported revolt against the regime.
101 While the brutal nature of the regime (in addition to the Hamma massacre) was well known and documented, successive U.S. Presidents turned a "blind eye" in the name of larger interests and goals. 102 In the context of this pragmatic policy, President Assad brutalized his people while negotiating with the U.S.; simply put, Syrian domestic affairs were an internal matter which the U.S. chose to ignore while focusing on broader geo-political considerations. The U.S. "blind eye" policy regarding domestic policy-regardless of its repressive nature and inevitable human cost-reflects respect for the principle of national sovereignty. 103 However, as documented above, the U.S. has repeatedly violated that principle when broader American interests are perceived to be at stake.
Which brings us to the question: why did the Obama Administration choose not to intervene in Syria in the spring and summer of 2011? How does the Obama Administration distinguish between Syria and Libya? Why does the extraordinary violation of human rights in the latter justify international intervention whereas the massacre of innocent civilians in the former does not? With respect to Syria, the Obama Administration has limited its response to largely meaningless rhetoric, some of it embarrassingly 'distant' and 'distracted.' Secretary of State Clinton's comments are but a telling example: "Syria's future is up to the Syrian people," she said, "but of course the efforts by the opposition to come together to organize in order to articulate a political agenda is an important part of political reform."
104
In both Libya and Syria a brutal regime was deliberately torturing, imprisoning and killing its own citizens. In both cases, thousands of citizens were forced to flee their homes with the understanding that the regime would brook no dissent, giving open fire orders that enabled indiscriminate shooting by its army into crowds of individuals. In other words, both regimes were engaged in massacring their citizens. While tragically not a new development in the Middle East, the confluence of the Arab Spring, social media, 105 and heightened international focus on the region drew greater media and public scrutiny regarding both regimes. 103 The protection of national sovereignty is a dominant theme in international relations and the development of international law. 
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The stated purpose of the military engagement was to force Gadhafi to either step down or leave Libya; 116 that mission has been accomplished. That achievement, however, does not resolve the core question this article seeks to address.
In stark contrast, while the U.S. forces engaged Libyan forces, President Assad continues-unabated and unhindered-to massacre innocent Syrians. 117 The Syrian opposition 118 does not seem to be organized, in contrast to Libyan rebels; similarly, the former do not appear to be armed to the extent the latter are. 119 However, in both cases the regime is directly engaging in the massacre of civilians; doubtlessly, some have taken up arms against the government whereas others are innocent victims of a brutal regime. There is a distinct difference between the Syrian opposition and Libyan rebels: the former are not organized and are seemingly poorly armed (at best) whereas the latter are organized and have been able to sufficiently arm CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
[Vol. 44:251 themselves overthrow 120 the Gadhafi regime. The same cannot be said for the Syrian opposition; the contrast is particularly compelling and tragic for Syrian refugees, who are literally pouring into Turkey in an effort to escape their own army. 121 The dichotomy, then, is clear: an organized rebel group is receiving significant international military assistance; an unorganized opposition has barely received the traditional platitudes that accompany non-intervention in the face of extraordinary violations of human rights. Declarations that the Syrian regime has lost legitimacy 122 are true, but they are just that, declarations; devoid of intervention, they are akin to whistling in the wind. That, however, is the essence of the Obama Administration's policy with respect to Syria: mere words. Needless to say, that is a far cry from the aggressive intervention policy with respect to Libya. A Syrian escaping into Turkey just meters ahead of a Syrian bulldozer must be dumbfounded to hear the language of President Obama's Cairo speech 123 and to see the U.S. air force aggressively attack Libyan targets.
Herein lies the rub: a compelling argument can be made that unorganized Syrians are in greater need of international intervention than organized Libyan rebels. That is, the U. unclear, it is to the principle of humanitarian intervention that this article now turns.
V. LAW OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
As Professor Ryan Goodman asked, "Should international law permit states to intervene militarily to stop a genocide or comparable atrocity without Security Council authorization?" 124 According to Article 39, Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter:
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security. 125 While the U.N. authorized military force against Libya, 126 it has not done so regarding Syria. 127 Does that mean the U.S. cannot intervene in Syria? As Professor Goodman and others have written, 128 international humanitarian intervention raises legitimate questions regarding pretext to "wage wars for ulterior motives." 129 From the perspective of international law, a discussion regarding international humanitarian intervention requires carefully analyzing the relationship between national sovereignty, international responsibility, and grave violations of human rights. The pretext argument suggested by Professor Goodman is of justifiable concern when examining specific examples of intervention; in the two examples discussed in this essay, the application of international humanitarian intervention principles reflects the inconsistency previously referenced.
Humanitarian intervention is an inherently complicated proposition, because it clearly implies both that nation state 'A' is engaged in significant violations of the human rights of its own citizens, requiring nation state 'B' and/or the international community to recognize that intervention is essential. 130 However, analysis of when intervention is deemed essential and criteria justifying intervention suggest an enormous lack of clarity and lack of objective standards and benchmarks.
The lack of clear criteria as to when intervention is justified, if not required, suggests that the question is one of interpretation, subject to specific circumstances and particular interests. 131 In that vein, then, the question-relevant to the discussion of this essay-is: why does the U.S. not determine that the actions of the Syrian government justify international humanitarian intervention? As of January 2012, the Syrian death toll was estimated to exceed five thousand people. 132 In addition to the rising death toll, anywhere between 15,000 to 40,000 protestors have been reported missing or in Syrian custody since the protests began. 133 In fact, a high-level U.N. human rights team recently released a report finding systematic human rights violations by the Syrian government, including summary executions, prisoner torture, and targeting children during the government's crackdown on opposition protestors. 134 Based on its findings, the U.N. 137 and NATO began flying sorties over the country. 138 Precisely because international law does not articulate either normative or architectural standards as to when international humanitarian intervention is justified, national leaders arguably have a responsibility to act. 139 The oft-cited phrase "when the cannons roar, the muses are silent" 140 is particularly relevant to this discussion. For a variety of reasons, the international community has determined-whether actively or passively-that the massacre of the Syrian population by the Assad government does not justify international humanitarian intervention. While the human rights violations occurring on a daily basis do not compare to the horrors of Rwanda, 141 Kosovo, 142 or Sierra Leone 143 they are not less compelling than the events tran-CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
[Vol. 44:251 spiring in Libya. If, by metaphorical analogy, the international community is the cannons and the U.S. is the muse, does that mean that the Obama Administration is required to be silent? After all, if the quote were to be rigorously applied, then many of the institutions created to minimize human suffering would neither exist, much less function in wartime. 144 While the distinction-from the perspective of international humanitarian intervention-between Libya and Syria is as unclear, as are the criteria that justify intervention, that must not serve as a misguided basis for the Obama Administration to largely turn its back on the Syrian people.
VI. FINAL WORD
The lack of precise international law criteria articulating when intervention is mandated must not serve as a convenient 'out' for the U.S. As described in detail above, the Middle East is presently in a state of extraordinary flux; uncertainty and dramatic change are the contemporary reality. Inherent to those is danger, significant human rights violations, and remarkable instability. In addition, a direct result of President Obama's Cairo speech and subsequent comments is the expectation that the U.S. will play a decisive role in the Middle East, reflecting attitudes and philosophies distinct from previous administrations. And yet, when given the opportunity to decisively and consistently act in a region of the world whose primary characteristics are instability and inconsistency, President Obama-in the Syrian context-blinked.
The Arab world's profound disappointment with President Obama 145 is, frankly, justified and disconcerting. President Obama has no one to blame but himself for this development. The disappointment is justified because, as the phrase goes, the bigger the expectation, the bigger the disappointment; it is disconcerting because there is no vacuum in the Middle East and powerful voices and forces of violence pose a threat to the region and world alike. Inconsistent foreign policy-particularly in a region of the world as volatile as the Middle East-is a luxury U.S. interests cannot brook. In other words, the law's uncertainty does not justify policy incon- . 145 See Glenn Greenwald, US More Unpopular in the Arab World than Under Bush, SALON (July 13, 2011), http://www.salon.com/news/middle_east/index.html?story=/opinion/green wald/2011/07/13/arabs (describing unfavorable attitudes towards the U.S. during the Obama administration when favorable attitudes dropped to levels lower than they were during the last year of the Bush Administration). sistency, particularly when Syrian citizens are suffering no less than Libyan citizens. In both paradigms, two repressive, historically brutal regimes that have long violated basic human rights are, once again, killing their own citizens. And yet, the powerful similarities notwithstanding, the Obama Administration has adopted two distinct responses to what are, in essence, mirror paradigms. In the context of providing much needed-actually critically required-humanitarian intervention, the President has failed the Syrian people. While the Administration has intensified its rhetoric 146 regarding the Syrian regime, words do not, and never have, provided actual assistance to those subjected to indiscriminate open fire orders with live ammunition. Perhaps words may satisfy the speaker, but to the victims, they are just words. While they can create expectation, and subsequent disappointment, they are not a substitute for action.
Some will query, and legitimately so, why it is the U.S. that must come to the assistance of the Syrian population. Obviously, the French and British have the capability, resources and historical relationship to the Middle East. However, neither President Sarkozy nor Prime Minister Cameron promised the people of the Middle East a new dawn; neither stood in Cairo and created the expectations that President Obama did. In addition-as a reality of contemporary geo-politics-in the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall, there is only one superpower in the world today. To be a superpower requires both military and moral leadership.
Criteria regarding international humanitarian intervention are unclear; however, the situation in Syria is clear. Nevertheless, the ambiguity surrounding whether/when a domestic crisis justifies international humanitarian intervention need not contribute to policy that is clearly at loggerheads with itself. That is, while the law is unclear, President Obama's polices are similarly unclear. What is clear, however, is that the Syrian government is massacring its citizens in a manner similar to the Libyan government. Evidently, the similarity ends there, for the actions of the Obama Administration are fundamentally different with respect to the two coun-CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
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tries. Needless to say, that is the President's prerogative; nevertheless, the dissonance is jarring, both philosophically and practically. Deciphering the President's policy is proving as complicated as establishing international standards justifying intervention. However, while the former can be subject to continuous academic debate, the human rights violations that define Syria today cannot be addressed by mere rhetoric, even if forceful. The President has an opportunity to apply the principles of international humanitarian intervention in a manner that will restore confidence in his leadership and set a clear example of consistency and stability. That is particularly important in a region of the world that is, at the moment, a most dangerous powder keg of extraordinary instability and danger.
